

Message Text

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

USMISSION BERLIN

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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, CU, UR

SUBJECT: BREZHNEV VISIT TO CUBA: JOINT DECLARATION

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VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE AND MEPC DEL

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD AND DAMASCUS

REF: MOSCOW 1490

1. SUMMARY: OUR READING OF SOVIET-CUBAN DECLARATION SUGGESTS THAT SOVIETS HAVE MOVED A SMALL STEP FURTHER IN GETTING CUBANS TO ACT LIKE MORE ORTHODOX MEMBERS OF SOCIALIST COMMUNITY. PORTIONS OF DECLARATION READ MORE LIKE SOVIET BILATERAL DOCUMENTS WITH MORE PLIANT OF THEIR EASTERN EUROPEAN BRETHREN THAN 1972 BREZHNEV-CASTRO COMMUNIQUE. EVEN ON LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES SOVIET HAND IS VISIBLE IN DECLARATION'S IMPLICIT REJECTION OF EXPORT OF REVOLUTION (THOUGH CUBANS APPARENTLY BALKED AT MAKING REJECTION EXPLICIT, AS BREZHNEV DID IN HIS HAVANA SPEECH - REFTEL). MORE AGGRESSIVE SOVIET APPROACH ON IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE WITH CAPITALISM (OBVIOUSLY NO PROBLEM FOR CASTRO) IS EVIDENT AS IS BREZHNEV'S MORE SOBER ASSESSMENT (FROM HAVANA SPEECH) OF PROGRESS OF DETENTE.

2. NO NEW SOVIET COMMITMENTS TO CUBA ARE DISCERNIBLE BEHIND EFFUSIVE BILATERAL VERBIAGE. TREATMENT OF U.S. INCLUDES GINGERLY CRITICISM OF CUBA POLICY AND BACK-HANDED COMPLIMENT FOR U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS. CHINA IS ALLUDED TO (INDIRECTLY) ONLY ONCE. SOVIETS - WHETHER FOR OWN REASONS OR BECAUSE OF CUBAN RELUCTANCE - PASSED UP THE OPPORTUNITY TO SURFACE THEIR SUPPORT FOR A WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.

3. D*CLARATION ABOUNDS IN REFERENCES TO SOCIALIST UNITY, WHICH NEARLY SUBMERGE SOVIETS' BOW TO "SPIRIT OF COMPLETE EQUALITY AND MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY" AS AMONG THE PRINCIPLES OF SOVIET-CUBAN RELATIONS. CENTRAL TASK OF FOREIGN POLICY OF TWO COUNTRIES IS DEFINED AS CONTRIBUTING "TO FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF POWER AND UNITY OF COMMUNITY OF SOCIALIST STATES AS WELL AS TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG THEM." EFFORTS TO BREAK UP THIS UNITY WILL BE OPPOSED, AND - IN ITS SOLE ALLUSION TO CHINA - DECLARATION ATTACKS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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" 'LEFT-WING' REVISIONISM AND HEGEMONISTIC AND CHAUVINIST TENDENCIES." HOWEVER, THERE IS NO MENTION (IN CHINESE OR ANY OTHER CONTEXT) OF NEED FOR A WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. THIS MAY INDICATE THAT SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO LET OTHER COMMUNIST PARTIES CARRY THE BALL IN PUBLIC ON THIS FOR A WHILE LONGER. OR PERHAPS THERE WERE PROBLEMS IN GETTING CASTRO TO SIGN ON.

4. SUPPORT FOR SOVIET PEACE POLICY AND DETENTE IN GENERAL

RECEIVES POSITIVE ENDORSEMENT IN DECLARATIONN ALTHOUGH CUBANS SEEM TO HAVE SUCCEEDED IN DILUTING SOME OF SOVIETS' CHARACTERISTIC HIGH-FLOWN RHETORIC. DOCUMENT WELCOMES MOVEMENT FROM COLD WAR TO DETENTE AND AFFIRMS THAT PEACE, BASED ON RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND EXCLUDING INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, CREATES FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR ADVANCE OF PROGRESSIVE CAUSES. IN TREATING THE CONTINUING IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE WITH CAPITALISM, DECLARATION ECHOES MORE CONFIDENT SOVIET APPROACH WHICH HAS FOLLOWED MOSCOW IDEOLOGICAL MEETING IN DECEMBER (WHICH CUBANS ATTENDED).

5. JOINTLY STATED VIEWS ON THIRD-COUNTRY ISSUES CONTAIN NO SURPRISES. SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED IN THE DECLARATION INCLUDE:

A. MIDDLE EAST. SOVIET POSITION IS ENDORSED JOINTLY IN TERMS SIMILAR TO BREZHNEV HAVANA SPEECH. PROGRESS TOWARD SETTLEMENT TO DATE (IN WHICH MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT IS NOT EVEN SINGLED OUT AS SEPARATE STEP) IS DESCRIBED AS PARTIAL MEASURES WHICH DO NOT EXTEND TO ENTIRE ZONE OF CONFLICT - PRESUMABLY A VEILED REFERENCE TO SYRIA. THESE MEASURES ARE STEPS IN RIGHT DIRECTION, BUT "RADICAL PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT" PROVIDING SECURITY FOR ALL STATES AND PEOPLES REMAINS URGENT.

B. ASIA. ON VIETNAM THERE IS NO DEPARTURE FROM STANDARD SOVIET PRONOUNCEMENTS DEMANDING OBSERVANCE OF PARIS AGREEMENT BY ALL PARTIES, CONDEMNING THOSE FORCES (UNIDENTIFIED) WHO SABOTAGE IT, AND AFFIRMING SUPPORT FOR PRG "WHICH REPRESENTS INTERESTS OF SVN PEOPLE" (BUT NO CLAIM OF EXCLUSIVE LEGITIMACY). THE LAOS SITUATION IS A GOOD THING, AND SOLIDARITY WITH CAMBODIAN PATRIOTS (NO FURTHER ELABORATION) IS EXPRESSED. CUBAN SUPPORT FOR SOVIET-ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORTS RATES A PARAGRAPH.

C. EUROPE. EUROPEAN ISSUES ARE TREATED IN THE SLIGHTLY MORE NEGATIVE VEIN OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH OF LAST WEEK. CSCE SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION (NO MENTION OF LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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SUMMIT). CONCRETE DECISIONS IN MBFR COULD ALSO BE USEFUL STEP. HOWEVER, ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLES ARE BEING CREATED IN BOTH FORUMS, AND CONDITIONS ARE BEING INVENTED WHICH AMOUNT TO ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

D. U.S. OPPONENTS OF DETENTE ARE SAID TO BE ACTIVE IN U.S. WHERE THEY SEEK TO STOP NORMALIZATION BEGUN IN U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS, WHICH IS IN PASSING PRAISED AS IMPORTANT ASPECT OF REDUCING MILITARY RISK AND PROMOTING PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. CUBANS IN THIS BACKHANDED FASHION IN EFFECT GENTLY ENDORSED SOVIET POSTURE TOWARD U.S.

E. LATIN AMERICA. SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN LATIN AMERICA WATERS DOWN SIERRA MAESTRA LOFTINESS WITH VOLGA-LIKE INERTIA. SOVIET INFLUENCE IS REFLECTED IN REJECTION OF USE OF THREAT OF FORCE AND CALL FOR RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN HEMISPHERE. WHILE

THIS PASSAGE IS FOLLOWED BY ONE CONDEMNING IMPERIALIST EFFORTS TO INTERFERE IN LA INTERNAL AFFAIRS, IT IMPLICITLY CAN APPLY TO SOCIALIST EXPORT OF REVOLUTION AS WELL (THOUGH CUBANS MANAGED TO AVOID DIRECT REFERENCE TO THIS). IT DOES NOT REFER TO AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AS DID 1972 BREZHNEV-CASTRO COMMUNIQUE. SOVIETS SUPPORT CUBAN DEMAND FOR "UNCONDITIONAL LIQUIDATION" OF U.S. BASE AT GUANTANAMO AND CALL FOR END OF ECONOMIC BLOCKADE OF CUBA. BOTH COUNTRIES MAKE SYMPATHETIC NOISES ABOUT CHILEAN PATRIOTS, BUT DISPOSE OF ISSUE BY REFERRING TO PRESENT SITUATION AS "TEMPORARY SETBACK."

F. DISARMAMENT. RITUAL SUPPORT FOR SOVIET WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AND NON-USE OF FORCE INITIATIVES IS OF INTEREST BECAUSE OF OMISSION OF ANY MENTION OF DIFENSE BUDGET REDUCTION (ROB) GAMBIT. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY CUBAN PROBLEMS WITH LATTER, AND OMISSION MAY SIMPLY REFLECT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF FACT THAT IT IS MORIBUND AT THIS TIME.

6. BILATERAL ELEMENTS OF DECLARATION CONTAIN PLEDGE BY BREZHNEV TO CONTINUE SOVIET ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT FOR CUBA, BUT NO NEW SOVIET COMMITMENTS ARE MENTIONED. IN LINE WITH RECENT SOVIET POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF CUBAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, DECLARATION NOTES IMPROVEMENT IN CUBAN ORGANIZATIONAL WORK AND ECONOMIC PLANNING AND SAYS ECONOMIC COOPERATION WILL BE DEVELOPED FURTHER ON BASIS OF 1972 ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS. SPECIFICALLY, DECLARATION CALLS FOR WIDER COOPERATION BETWEEN SOVIET AND CUBAN PLANNING BODIES, MINISTRIES, DEPARTMENTS AND FACTORY PERSONNEL.
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SOVIET ASSISTANCE WILL FOCUS ON INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, MECHANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE AND PERSONNEL TRAINING. IN CONTRAST TO 1972 BREZHNEV-CASTRO COMMUNIQUE, THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO DEFENSE COOPERATION.

7. THRUST OF DECLARATION, AS WELL AS WARMTH APPARENT THROUGHOUT VISIT, IS DESIGNED TO SHOW VISIT AS SUCCESS. NEVERTHELESS, DECLARATION SPEAKS OF "FULL UNITY OF VIEWS WITH REGARD TO CONTEMPORARY SITUATION IN WORLD AND TASKS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF SOCIALIST STATES" - LEAVING POSSIBILITY THAT TWO SIDES DID NOT FULLY AGREE ON CUBAN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT OR ON INTERNATIONAL PARTY QUESTIONS.DUBS

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